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Buffer Capital, Loan Portfolio Quality and the Performance of Microfinance 
Institutions: A Global Analysis 
Abstract 
Using a sample of 625 microfinance institutions (MFI) across 40 countries from 2010-2015, 
we empirically examine the effect of buffer capital on the performance of MFIs and how this 
effect varies with loan portfolio quality. We find a negative relationship between buffer capital 
and MFIs’ performance. We further document that loan portfolio quality positively moderates 
the buffer capital-MFI performance relationship. We demonstrate that the buffer capital-loan 
portfolio quality relationship does not vary for deposit-taking, profit-making, and regulated 
MFIs. Our findings shed new light on the value relevance of capital in microfinance 


















The capital requirement in financial institutions has become a contentious issue. Regulators 
and the public argue that financial institutions should hold higher levels of capital because of 
the externalities associated with the safety net provided to them (Berger and Bouwman, 2013). 
Thus, holding more capital can lead to an improvement in social efficiency. In contrast, 
practitioners argue that holding high levels of capital will reduce operations (Berger and 
Bouwman, 2013). Due to these divergent views, several studies have investigated the effect of 
capital on the performance of financial institutions (Diamond and Rajan, 2001; Osborne et al., 
2012; Lee et al., 2015). However, a critical part of the financial sector that has received little 
attention in the literature is microfinance institutions (MFIs).  
MFIs have become the backbone of countries around the world (Bogan, 2012). In fact, 
in most developing countries, MFIs typify the banking prototype that people seek. Nonetheless, 
a major challenge facing the microfinance sector is capital (Bogan, 2012; Dorfleitner et al., 
2016). Unlike traditional banks, most MFIs do not have access to debt (Dorfleitner et al., 2016) 
and deposits (Galema et al., 2011). Indeed, only the very big and well-established MFIs have 
access to debt finance (Bogan, 2012). Further, according to the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (2010), just about 5% of MFIs take deposits. Although credit-only MFIs that do 
not take deposits are not subject to prudential regulations, their regulatory mechanisms include 
capital adequacy requirements. The capital adequacy requirements are meant to measure MFIs’ 
resilience to losses (Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2016). Consequently, the lack of deposits and debt 
capital induce most MFIs to rely on owners’ equity, donations, grants, and subsidised equity to 
be able to allocate loans and fund their projects (Minton and Schrand, 1999; Schaeck and 
Cihak, 2012; Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2014). In fact, donations and grants constitute the main 
funding source of most MFIs. However, despite their reliance on donations and grants, some 
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MFIs hold buffer capital: capital in excess of the minimum capital requirement. We examine 
whether buffer capital has performance effects in MFIs. 
A major idiosyncratic characteristic of MFIs is poor loan portfolio quality. MFIs 
primarily focus on the provision of financial services (credit and savings) to the poor, low-
income persons and informal businesses (Becchetti and Castriota, 2011; Rai and Ravi, 2011). 
As a result, they have a risky clientele profile because they serve informationally opaque 
borrowers (Berger and Black, 2011). This exposes them to a higher credit risk leading to poor 
loan portfolio quality (Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2016). However, because the loan portfolio is by 
far the largest asset of an MFI, risks associated with it can have debilitating consequences 
(Yimga, 2016). Nevertheless, buffer capital insulates MFIs against survival threats posed by 
poor loan portfolio quality (Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2016). Thus, higher buffer capital may be 
necessary to make MFIs operationally self-sufficient in the midst of deteriorating loan portfolio 
quality. Consequently, Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2016) suggests that the buffer capital 
requirements of MFIs may vary due to differences in the level of loan portfolio quality. We 
consider how loan portfolio quality affects the buffer capital-MFI performance relationship.  
In addressing these questions, we also present a sketch showing the evolution of buffer 
capital and loan portfolio quality over the sample period. As shown in Figure 1, buffer capital 
and loan portfolio losses seemed to diverge. However, they later converged in a way that 
supports Tchakoute-Tchuigoua’s (2016) argument regarding the connection between buffer 
capital and loan portfolio loss. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
Using a sample of 625 MFIs across 40 countries for the period 2010 to 2015, we find 
that buffer capital is value decreasing in microfinance institutions. Nevertheless, loan portfolio 
quality positively moderates the buffer capital-MFI performance relationship. Further analyses 
reveal that the buffer capital-performance relationship does not change for deposit-taking, 
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profit-making, and regulated MFIs. We offer alternative explanations for these results. Our 
results are robust to endogeneity and a battery of other robustness tests.  
Our study makes several contributions to the literature.  First, studies relating to the 
capital of financial institutions to date have mainly focused on traditional banks (Osborne et al. 
2012; Berger and Bouwman, 2013; Guidara et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2015). MFIs are different 
because unlike traditional banks, MFIs mostly have limited access to deposits and debts. They 
predominantly rely on donations, grants and subsidised equity (Hudon and Traca, 2011; 
Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2016). These sources of funds are difficult to come by and donors, as 
well as providers of grants and subsidised equity mostly demand that certain social objectives 
are met (Bos and Millone, 2015). Unlike traditional banks where providers of capital expect a 
financial return, MFIs’ access to funds may lead to the pursuance of other social activities 
which may not necessarily be performance enhancing. Due to this, existing studies suggest that 
increased use of subsidies (Hudon and Traca, 2011) and grants (Bogan, 2012) reduces the 
performance of MFIs. Thus, the buffer capital-performance relationship in MFIs may differ 
from that of traditional banks. We contribute to the literature by providing evidence that buffer 
capital reduces performance in MFIs.  
Second, we extend prior studies on the capital requirements of financial institutions by 
investigating how loan portfolio quality affects the value relevance of buffer capital. Existing 
literature documents that although higher capital requirements may be expensive for MFIs, 
buffer capital helps to absorb loan losses (Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005). Indeed, Tchakoute-
Tchuigoua (2016) suggest that differences in loan portfolio quality explain the level of buffer 
capital kept by MFIs but their study fell short of investigating how these affect the value 
relevance of buffer capital. Our study fills this gap in the literature by documenting that poor 
loan portfolio quality positively moderates the buffer capital-MFI performance relationship. 
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This increases our understanding of how the value relevance of buffer capital might differ 
among MFIs with different characteristics.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the 
background of MFIs. Section 3 reviews the empirical literature and hypotheses development. 
Section 4 develops the research methodology. The main results are presented in section 5. 
Robustness tests are presented in sections 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Background – Performance Implications of MFI Funding Sources 
The microfinance industry is growing at a fast pace worldwide, serving around 115 million 
people (Dichter, 1999). MFIs promise to reduce poverty in low income communities by 
employing profit-making banking practices (Cull et al., 2007). Consequently, they have a 
duality of purpose premised on social impact and financial viability logics (Yunus, 2008).  
Within the social impact logic, they are expected to be critical to poverty alleviation and 
financial inclusion imperatives in their countries of operation. This may include the provision 
of financial services (credit and savings) to the poor, low-income persons and informal 
businesses, as well as making lending and recruitment policies that favour a particular group 
of people in society such as women (Becchetti and Castriota, 2011; D’Espallier et al., 2011; 
Rai and Ravi, 2011).  
More so, within the banking logic, MFIs are expected to operate in a way that is 
sustainable, financially viable and operationally self-sufficient (profitable) through the 
adoption of responsible banking principles that enhance profitability (Allet, 2014; Servet, 
2006; Yunus, 2008). Thus, MFIs are expected to exhibit financial accountability through 
improved profitability in a way that makes them operationally self-sufficient (Allet, 2014).  
Double-bottomline or hybridized operations also make funding a major challenge for 
MFIs (D’Espallier et al., 2013; Tcguigoua, 2017; Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Kent and Dacin, 
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2013). This is because although funding sources for MFIs include grants, donations, debts, 
equity and deposits, most MFIs neither take deposits nor have access to the debt market, leaving 
grants, donations, and equity as the main funding sources (Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2010). 
However, the hybridized operations incentivize most donors and providers of grants to impose 
further conditions on the MFIs they fund that further tilts their operations to one of the dual 
objectives.  For example, although traditional banks strive to avoid risky borrowers (Faleye 
and Krishnan, 2011), donors and funders such as the IMF and the World Bank require MFIs to 
deepen their pro-poor banking strategy and target risky borrowers excluded by traditional 
banks, often driven by the need to enhance access to finance (Strom et al., 2014; Gupta, 2014). 
Further, motivated by funders, MFIs in the Women’s World Banking network adopt lending 
and recruitment policies to achieve gender equality objectives rather than profitability. 
Similarly, Jia et al. (2016) report that commercial funders pressure MFIs to focus more on the 
banking and profitability logic. 
Indeed, a banking model based on giving uncollateralised loans to the poor in low 
income communities with high information asymmetry, while making recruitment decisions 
based on reasons other than skills and qualifications, may threaten MFIs’ profitability and 
operational self-sufficiency (Besley, 1995; Cull et al., 2007; Strom et al., 2014; Gupta, 2014).  
Accordingly, some studies argue that the social objective of MFIs threatens operational self-
sufficiency and profitability. In fact, Paxton et al. (2000) report that there is a trade-off between 
the social objective and MFIs’ financial sustainability. A survey by the Microbanking Bulletin 
(2007) showed that 41% of MFIs are not self-sustainable. Lopatta et al. (2017) attribute this to 
the focus on social logic, arguing that there is a negative relationship between financial and 
social logic. There is also evidence that only a few MFIs have managed to survive without 
donations and grants (Hudon and Traca, 2011; Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2014).  Indeed, 
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D’Espallier et al. (2013) indicate that only about 23% of MFIs worldwide can survive without 
subsidies and grants.  
 
3. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
3.1 Buffer capital and MFIs’ performance  
Few studies have examined the relationship between buffer capital and MFIs’ performance. 
Bogan (2012) examined the effect of changes in MFIs capital structure on performance using 
data from MFIs in Africa, East Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and 
South Asia. The study finds that increased use of grants decrease performance. Hudon and 
Traca (2011) investigated the effect of subsidies on MFIs’ performance. They reported that 
subsidies are good for MFIs but over subsidisation decreases performance. Others including 
Paxton et al. (2000) and Lopatta et al (2017) reported a trade-off between the financial and 
social objectives of MFIs. Thus, although MFIs mainly rely on grants and subsidies 
(Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2016), providers of grants and subsidies may influence MFIs to focus 
more on their social objectives. Therefore, these studies suggest that raising capital through 
grants and subsidies can be value-decreasing in MFIs.  
According to the trade-off theory, an optimal capital that trades off costs and benefits 
should enhance performance (Berger et al., 1995; Osborne et al., 2012). However, the capital 
adequacy requirement imposed by regulators means MFIs may not operate at the optimal 
capital and this may affect performance. To reduce the risk of going below the capital adequacy 
ratio, MFIs may keep buffer capital. A study by Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2016) recorded the 
average buffer capital of the MFIs in his sample to be around 21%. The holding of buffer capital 
is expected to be costly to MFIs; it represents an opportunity cost because the amount could be 
invested in a profitable venture to generate income (Goddard et al., 2013).  Thus, the holding 
of buffer capital constrains MFIs operations. Based on these, we hypothesise that:  
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H1. Buffer capital is negatively associated with MFIs’ performance 
 
3.2 Buffer Capital, Loan Portfolio Quality and MFI Performance. 
Loan portfolio quality which represents the loan portfolio at risk of non-payment by clients is 
expected to affect the value relevance of buffer capital. A deterioration in loan portfolio quality 
will lead to a reduction in income (Peek and Rosengren, 1995; Christen et al., 2012) due to 
loan losses (Osborne et al., 2012).  This has the effect of reducing the performance level of an 
MFI (Floro, 2010, Mehran and Thakor, 2011).  A reduction in performance due to loan losses 
will, in turn, cause a decrease in the loanable amount available to an MFI and curtail its 
activities (Osborne et al., 2012; Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2016). Mehran and Thakor, (2011) 
suggest that expected and unexpected loan losses increase the probability of bankruptcy and 
insolvency for financial institutions. However, with buffer capital an MFI will be able to 
continue its operations in the presence of loan losses, thereby not forgoing current and future 
income. Consequently, the holding of buffer capital for the sake of loan losses should result in 
higher MFI performance.  
A deterioration in loan portfolio quality may cause a reduction in the capital levels of 
MFIs because loan losses will eventually lead to the depletion of capital. Thus, loan losses 
harm valuable capital (Floro, 2010), increases the probability of capital falling below capital 
adequacy threshold and make MFIs susceptible to regulatory penalties and sanctions (Schaeck 
and Cihak, 2012). To avoid such regulatory penalties, MFIs may have to raise emergency 
capital. This emergency capital can be particularly expensive in unfavourable market 
conditions (Osborne et al., 2012). Nevertheless, Gambacorta and Mistrulli, (2004) suggest that 
MFIs that hold capital in excess of the minimum required may be able to absorb output shocks 
relative to less capitalised MFIs. Therefore, with output shocks caused by a deteriorating loan 
portfolio quality, buffer capital may increase performance by helping an MFI avoid the 
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payment of these penalties (Benes and Kumhof, 2015). Buffer capital is, therefore, expected to 
impact positively on the performance of MFIs in the presence of loan losses because it obviates 
the need to raise emergency capital and makes MFIs resilient to shocks to operating 
performance (Boyd and De Nocolo, 2005; Marinez-Miera and Repullo, 2010). Based on these 
considerations, we hypothesise that: 




4.1. Data Source and Sample Selection 
We use data from the MIX market database; a web-based microfinance platform that provides 
data on MFIs across several countries. Generally, most studies on MFIs use data from MIX 
market database (see, Hudon and Traca, 2011; Mersland et al., 2011; Galema et al., 2012; 
Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2014; Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2016). A major advantage of the MIX 
market database is its worldwide coverage (Bogan, 2012). However, the MIX market database 
provides self-reported data which could give rise to data reliability issues. For example, not all 
MFIs may provide audited information. The diamond star is a classification based on the extent 
to which a particular MFI’s reports and financial statements are certified, audited, or rated by 
reputable rating agencies (see, Quayes, 2012; Assefa et al., 2013; Louis and Baesens, 2013). 
The diamond star depicts the degree of transparency and reliability of MFIs’ information. 
These diamond star categories range from 1 to 5, where 5 indicates the highest level of reliable 
MFI information (Assefa et al., 2013). As a result, many studies (Quayes, 2012; Assefa et al., 
2013; Louis and Baesens, 2013; Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2016) have restricted their sample to 
MFIs with diamond star 4 and above because such MFIs have more reliable financial 
information.  We, therefore, follow previous studies and restrict our sample to firms with 
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diamond star 4 and 5. Therefore, the sample consists of 625 MFIs and 1,708 firm-year 
observations for the period from 2010 to 2015 across 40 countries.  
The sample involves MFIs from six regions as defined by the MIX market database 
including Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America 
and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, as well as South Asia. The country-specific 
information is sourced from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI).  
 
4.2. Variables  
4.2.1. The dependent variable  
We measure MFI performance in two ways: return on assets (ROA) and operational self-
sufficiency (OSS). ROA has been used extensively as a measure of performance in MFIs (see, 
Assefa et al., 2013; D’espallier et al., 2017). The ROA is defined as the ratio of operating profit 
scaled by total assets. Further, operating self-sufficiency (OSS) is an important measure of 
performance in MFIs (see, Assefa et al., 2013; Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2014; Tchakoute-
Tchuigoua, 2016). The OSS is defined as the ratio of financial revenue scaled by financial 
expenses plus net impairment loss and operating expense.  It measures how far an MFI has 
come in covering its operating expenses with its operating income (Hartarska, 2005; Cull et 
al., 2007). The OSS is commonly used by donors and MFI management to assess performance 
(Rosenberg, 2009).   
 
4.2.2 Independent variables 
Our main variable of interest is buffer capital. We follow Valencia and Bolanos (2018) and 
measure buffer capital as the difference between an MFI optimal capital ratio and the minimum 
capital requirement1. The country level minimum capital adequacy ratio is obtained from 
                                                          
1 We use the terms minimum capital requirement and minimum capital adequacy ratio interchangeably. 
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different sources (see, Appendix 1), which remained constant throughout the sample period. 
The optimal capital ratio is not observable and, therefore, we follow previous studies in the 
financial literature (Jokipii and Milne, 2008; Valencia and Bolanos 2018) and predict it using 
MFI-specific and country level determinants.  In all nine, MFI-specific variables are employed. 
These include: Return on capital employed (ROCE), which is measured as the ratio of profit 
for the year to equity plus total liabilities; Size, which is defined as the natural logarithm of the 
book value of total assets; Top quartile biggest MFIs (SizeCo), which is a dummy variable that 
takes one if the MFI size belongs to the top quartile in the sample and zero otherwise; Loan 
loss to the gross loan (LLGL), which measures the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loan 
portfolio; Cost of funding (CF), measured as the ratio of interest expenses on borrowings; Profit 
status, which is a dummy variable equals to one for profit-making MFIs and zero otherwise; 
Outreach, which is a dummy variable equals to one for large outreach MFIs, two for medium 
outreach MFIs and three for small outreach MFIs; Regulation, which is a dummy variable equal 
to one if an MFI is regulated and zero otherwise; and, finally, Target market, which is a dummy 
indicator for the four target markets classified as broad (1), high-end (2), low-end (3) and small 
business (4). 
 At the country level, we include the following variables: Gross domestic product 
growth (GDP growth), defined as the annual growth rate of the GDP per capita of a country;  
Inflation as a percentage of GDP (Inflation/GDP); Domestic credit to the financial sector as a 
percentage of GDP (Financial sector development); Rule of law, which assesses the law and 
order tradition of countries; Political stability, measuring the perceptions of the likelihood that 
the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means; and, 
Lerner index (Lerner), which measures the competitiveness of the MFI market. We follow 
Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, (2016) and compute the Lerner index as: 
𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝑖𝑡– 𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡          (1) 
        𝑃𝑖𝑡 
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Where: P = the price of output, measured by the real gross portfolio yield (Cull et al., 2007). 
MC is the marginal cost derived from the following translog cost function: 




2 + ∑ 𝑦𝑘𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑘,𝑖𝑡 + ∑ ∅𝑘𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑘,𝑖𝑡 +
1
2





2 + 𝛿3𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑡(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑) + ∑ 𝜑𝑘𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑘,𝑖𝑡(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑) + 𝜃𝑡 𝑙𝑛(𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒) +
𝜃2𝑃𝑎𝑟30 + 𝑉𝑖𝑡 − 𝑠𝑢𝑖𝑡          (2) 
Where:  
Cit = the total cost for an MFI i at the year t, calculated as financial expenses plus 
operating expenses. yit = a proxy for output for an MFI i at the year t, defined as the gross loan 
portfolio. wk,it = the three input prices respectively: labour (w1: personal expenses scaled by 
number of employees), financial capital (w2: financial expenses scaled by total liabilities), and 
physical capital [w3: (operating expenses minus personnel expenses) scaled by total assets]. 
Trend = natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. Par30 = loan portfolio quality. Size 
= the total asset in US dollars. vit = the idiosyncratic error. suit = time-varying the panel-level 
effect.  
The optimal capital ratio is derived from the residuals of the following regression: 
𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑀𝐹𝐼𝑖,𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=9 + ∑ 𝛽2
𝑛
𝑖=6 𝐶𝑉𝑗𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡      (3) 
Where: 
ACR = Actual capital ratio, which is calculated as the ratio of total equity to total assets (see, 
Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2014; Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2016). MFI = MFI specific variables 
(ROCE, Size, SizeCo, LLRGL, CF, Profit, Outreach, Regulated, Target). 𝐶𝑉𝑗𝑡 = country-
specific variables (GDP growth, Inflation/GDP, financial sector development, rule of law, 
political stability, Lerner index). 
Thus, following the approach of Valencia and Bolanos (2018), buffer capital is 
measured as the excess of the optimal capital ratio required by an MFI over the minimum 
capital adequacy ratio of the country of operation. In this case, a positive (negative) buffer 
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capital indicates that a particular MFI is holding more (less) capital than required. Buffer capital 
is derived as follows: 
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡    (4) 
 
4.2.3 Econometric model 
To answer the question of whether buffer capital is value enhancing for MFIs, we use the panel 
data approach and control for MFI level variables as well as country-specific variables. In order 
to choose between fixed effect and random effect models, a Hausman’s test is carried out to 
determine whether the unobserved heterogeneity (µi) of each firm and the explanatory variables 
are correlated. The null hypothesis was rejected by the Hausman’s test, which indicates that 
the unobserved heterogeneity and the regressors are uncorrelated. This suggests that the fixed 
effects estimator is the more consistent and efficient method to use. Consequently, the fixed 
effect specification is preferred. We also control for year effects in all our regressions.  
In line with previous studies (Godquin, 2004; Schaeck and Cihak, 2012; Assefa et al., 
2013; Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2016), we first include MFI-specific variables that are known in 
the literature to affect performance. Loan portfolio quality may reduce performance because it 
increases MFIs’ riskiness (Mehran and Thakhor, 2011). We, therefore, include loan portfolio 
quality in all the regressions. Studies have shown that the number of years of existence affect 
firm performance (Loderer and Waelchli 2010). For example, it may take time for younger 
MFIs to improve performance by building a clientele base. We, therefore, control for MFI age. 
In terms of age, Mix Market classify MFIs into three different categories: new, young, and 
mature. Therefore, our measure for Age consists of three different dummy variables for each 
of these categories. Further, an MFI’s performance may be affected by outstanding loan 
portfolio through interest income. We, therefore, control for the level of the outstanding loan. 
Also, we control for size because MFI size is a determinant of performance due to the 
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economies of scale that larger firms enjoy (Serrasqueiro and Nunes, 2008). According to the 
agency theory, a large board size may impair meaningful board discussion and, therefore, affect 
overall MFI performance. We, therefore, control for the number of board of directors (Board 
size). Many recent studies have advocated for the presence of women on boards because they 
help improve performance (Mersland and Strøm, 2009; Gyapong et al., 2016). Therefore, the 
ratio of women directors (Female), measured as the ratio of women directors to board size is 
included. Leverage, measured as the ratio of liabilities to total assets is also controlled for. We 
also include the total expenses to total assets (Expense/Assets) because efficiency through 
expenses reduction is likely to lead to higher MFI performance. We control for the scale of 
operation, which refers to the scale of financial products and services provided to the poor by 
MFI groups. MFIs are grouped into small, medium and large scale of operations. Other control 
variables included are outreach, profit status, regulation, and target market, which have been 
defined in section 4.2.2 above. 
Our second set of control variables relates to country-wide data.  The overall growth of 
the economy has an impact on MFI performance, we, therefore, include GDP growth. The loss 
of the purchasing power of money could affect MFIs’ performance. This is because inflation 
reduces the value of money. Inflation as a percentage of GDP growth is therefore included in 
the regressions. Further, since MFIs belong to the financial sector, their performance is affected 
by the level of financial sector development in the country of operation. We, therefore, control 
for financial sector development. Also, MFIs’ performance may improve due to the strength of 
the rule of law. This is because MFIs operating in environments with strong rule of law have 
fewer loan losses (Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2014). Rule of law is therefore included as a control 
variable. Finally, we include political stability because businesses thrive under stable political 
environment (Julio and Yook, 2012). 
 To test our hypotheses, a fixed effects model is employed in the form:  
16 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽2𝑀𝐹𝐼𝑖,𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=13 + ∑ 𝛽3
𝑛
𝑖=5 𝐶𝑉𝐽,𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡     (5) 
Where: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ROA or OSS for MFI ί at year t. 𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 = buffer capital for MFI ί at year t. 𝑀𝐹𝐼𝑖𝑡 = MFI-
specific variables including, loan portfolio quality, outstanding loan portfolio, size, 
expenses/assets, leverage, age, outreach, profit status, regulation, target market, scale of 
operation, board size, female for MFI ί at year t.  𝐶𝑉𝑗𝑡 = country specific variables including, 
GDP growth, inflation/GDP, financial sector development, rule of law, political stability for 
country j at year t. 𝑒𝑖 = the idiosyncratic error. All variables are as defined in Table 1.  
 [INSERT TABLE 1] 
 
5. Empirical analyses 
5.1 Summary statistics 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for all the variables used in the regressions. All continuous 
variables are winsorised at the top 0.5% and the bottom 0.5% to reduce the problem of outliers. 
The mean value of the ROA is 0.0286 which shows that on average the sampled MFIs are 
barely profitable. The ROA of 2.86% is close to that reported by Mersland and Strøm (2009). 
The mean value of the OSS is 1.2384 which shows that on average the sampled MFIs have 
financial revenues that are higher than their total expenses. Buffer capital has a mean of 0.2358, 
which indicates that the average MFI in our sample is operating with a capital ratio well above 
the minimum capital adequacy ratio. This is similar to the 21% reported by Tchakoute-
Tchuigoua (2016) and approximates to US$196,893 worth of assets for the average MFI in our 
sample. Also, MFIs in the sample have approximately 8.71% of their loan portfolio at risk less 
than 30 days. This percentage is similar to the 7.1% reported by Mersland and Strom (2009). 
Further, size has a mean of US$83.5 million and a median of US$14.3 million. This is far below 
that of traditional banks in North Africa ($37.48 billion), Central Africa ($56.16 billion) and 
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Southern Africa ($29.71 billion) (see, Sissy et al., 2017). This shows that MFIs are smaller in 
size compared to traditional banks. In terms of the corporate governance structure, the average 
MFI in our sample has a board size of 9.3835 and percentage of female directors of 29.54%, 
similar to the figures reported by Mersland and Strom (2009) as 7.391 and 23.5% for board 
size and percentage of female directors, respectively. 
Regarding the country-specific variables, the average financial sector development for 
countries included in this study is 0.3973. This indicates that the level of financial sector 
development of countries under consideration is 39.73%.  This is below that of other developed 
countries like France (84%), UK (116%) or US (184%) (See, Beck et al., 2008) and implies 
that MFIs are mainly found in developing countries with relatively undeveloped financial 
sector.  
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
Table 3 presents country averages for minimum capital adequacy ratio, optimal capital ratio, 
buffer capital, ROA and OSS; number of MFIs and year-observations. The country with the 
highest level of minimum capital adequacy ratio is Uganda with 20%; whiles the country with 
the lowest actual capital is Swaziland with 8%. The two countries with the highest and lowest 
optimal capital are Georgia (42.61%) and Kosovo (25.31%), respectively. The results show 
that the most profitable (least profitable) MFIs are in Vietnam (Bulgaria) with an average ROA 
of 5.32 % (0.094%). In terms of OSS, the country with the highest (lowest) value is Benin 
(Haiti) with an average OSS of 1.5064 (1.1166). The last two columns show wide variations in 
terms of the number of MFIs and their year observations across different countries represented 
in the sample. 
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
Pearson’s bivariate correlation matrix of the dependent and independent variables are presented 
in Table 4. Liu et al. (2014) noted that a correlation greater than or equal to 0.7 is an indication 
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of multicollinearity. However, the results in Table 4 indicate that correlations between the 
independent variables are generally low, with no correlation greater than or equal to 0.5. We 
also check for multicollinearity by using the variance inflation factor (VIF). The mean VIF 
value is 1.40, and ranges from 1.05 to 2.18. The range of the VIF falls far below the 
conventional threshold of 10 (Gujarati, 2009). Therefore, multicollinearity is not a serious issue 
for our estimates.  
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
5.2 Main results 
Table 5 presents the regression results. Consistent with Petersen (2009), we account for 
heteroscedasticity by clustering the standard errors at the MFI-level.  
 
5.2.1 Buffer capital and MFIs’ performance 
As shown in the descriptive statistics (Table 2), most MFIs keep buffer capital despite their 
limited access to debt capital and difficulties in accessing other forms of funds. We examine 
the value relevance of buffer capital in MFIs. Specifically, we investigate the effect of buffer 
capital on MFI performance (ROA). The results are shown in Table 5 (column 1). It indicates 
that buffer capital has a negative relationship with MFIs’ performance (Buffer capital = –
0.1015; t-statistics = –4.54) and the relationship is statistically significant at the 1% level. This 
finding supports H1 and indicates that buffer capital reduces the performance of MFIs. 
Specifically, the findings show that a 10% increase in buffer capital is associated with 
approximately 1.015% reduction in ROA. This is consistent with the results when using the 
OSS as a measure of performance. As shown in Table 5, columns (3). Column (3) shows that 
buffer capital still impacts negatively on MFI performance using OSS (Buffer capital = –
0.5394, t-statistics = –4.05) 
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These results indicate that ceteres paribus, MFIs with capital in excess of the minimum 
capital adequacy have lower performance. The trade-off theory suggests that optimal capital 
should enhance performance because it trades off benefits and costs (Berger et al., 1995; 
Osborne et al., 2012). Therefore, the negative association between buffer capital and MFIs’ 
performance may be because the holding of buffer capital distorts optimality and reduces 
performance. Further, Mia and Lee (2017) documented that funders influence MFIs so that one 
of either their profitability or social objectives overshadow the other. Nonetheless, Tchakoute-
Tchuigoua (2016) suggests that most MFIs rely on subsidies and grants for funding. There is 
also evidence that a focus on social objectives reduces profitability (Lopatta et al., 2017). 
Therefore, the negative buffer capital-performance relationship may also be attributed to the 
fact that MFIs rely on providers of grants and subsidies, and these funders influence them to 
focus more on their social objections leading to a decline in performance. 
 
5.2.2 Buffer capital, loan portfolio quality and MFIs’ performance 
To test the effect of loan portfolio quality on the relationship between buffer capital and MFIs’ 
profitability, we re-estimate equation (5) and moderate buffer capital with loan portfolio 
quality. The regression results as reported in Table 5 column (2) show that the buffer capital-
loan portfolio quality interaction has a positive and statistically significant relationship with 
ROA (Buffer capital*Par30 = 0.6652, t-statistics = 4.54). Similarly, results in column (4) 
indicate that when using OSS as a performance measure the buffer capital-loan portfolio quality 
interaction has a positive and statistically significant relationship with MFI performance 
(Buffer capital*Par30 = 1.7591, t-statistics = 2.20).   
This is consistent with H2 and indicates that loan portfolio quality positively moderates 
the buffer capital-MFI performance relationship. This implies that MFIs with poor loan 
portfolio quality can improve performance by keeping buffer capital. Poor loan portfolio 
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quality increases MFIs’ riskiness by exposing them to insolvency (Mehran and Thakhor, 2011). 
Additionally, poor loan quality can reduce capital levels and impinge on the ability of MFIs to 
lend, thereby reducing performance. However, compared to traditional banks, MFIs are 
particularly prone to poor loan portfolio quality. This is because MFIs mainly serve 
informationally opaque customers (Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2016). The results are, therefore, in 
consonance with the argument that poor loan portfolio quality causes MFIs to hold higher 
buffer capital (Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2016). The findings support Boyd and De Nocolo (2005) 
and Marinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) who noted the need for higher capital levels in times 
of poor loan portfolio quality.  
 [INSERT TABLE 5] 
6. Robustness Tests 
6.1 Deposit-taking MFIs 
MFIs mainly rely on owners’ equity, donations, and grants because they mostly have no access 
to debt markets (Dorfleitner et al., 2016) and only a few take deposits (Bogan, 2012). In fact, 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010) states that only 5% of MFIs take deposits. 
Nevertheless, deposits are cheaper than external funds (Berger et al., 1995; Gorton and Winton, 
2003) because external funds attract higher expected return (Allen et al., 2011). Impliedly, 
buffer capital is likely to be more expensive for non-deposit taking MFIs because they lack 
access to customer deposits which may be cheaper than the other available sources of funding. 
Consequently, it could be the case that the negative buffer capital-performance relationship is 
driven by non-deposit taking MFIs in our sample.  We, therefore, investigate whether the buffer 
capital-MFI performance relationship is different for deposit-taking MFIs. To achieve this, we 




The results are reported in Table 6 (columns 1 and 2). In column (1), the results indicate 
that the relationship between buffer capital and the performance of deposit-taking MFIs is 
negative despite having access to clients’ deposits (Buffer capital = –0.0737, t-statistics = –
1.97).  In terms of how loan portfolio quality moderates the buffer capital-performance 
relationship, the results in column (2) show that deposit-taking MFIs that hold buffer capital in 
the presence of poor loan portfolio quality enjoy higher performance (Buffer capital*part30 = 
0.5234, t-statistics = 2.06). These indicate that our results are not driven by non-deposit taking 
MFIs. 
 
6.2 Profit-making MFIs 
Some MFIs operate as for-profit organisations; however, the majority of MFIs are operating as 
not-for-profit organisations (Hartarska et al., 2013). One argument expounded in the literature 
as a way for MFIs to become operationally self-sufficient is through commercialisation 
(Armendáriz de Aghion & Morduch, 2000; Battilana & Dorado, 2010); from not-for-profit to 
for-profit. Commercialisation can help MFIs to attract different sources of funds including 
commercial debt. Achieving profit status may increase an MFI’s access to capital because it 
will help attract profit-maximizing investors (Cull et al., 2009). With the increased access to 
other sources of funds (commercial capital) relative to non-profit MFIs, for-profit MFIs may 
be able to avoid other expensive sources of capital with stringent conditionalities that may 
require them to pursue value-decreasing social missions (Downey and Conroy, 2010; Mia and 
Lee, 2016).  Thus, if buffer capital is more expensive for not-for-profit MFIs, then not-for-
profit MFIs could be driving the buffer capital MFI-performance relationship.  
 We examine whether our results hold for-profit MFIs. To do that, we segregate our 
sample into for-profit and not-for-profit samples and focus only on the former. The results 
which are presented in Table 6, column (3), show that buffer capital is negatively associated 
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with the performance of for-profit MFIs (Buffer capital = –0.0850, t-statistics = –2.77). 
Moreover, the interaction of buffer and loan portfolio quality in column (4) show a positive 
and statistically significant association (Buffer capital*part30 = 0.8632, t-statistics = 4.63). 
These results indicate that the main results reported in Table 5 do not differ for for-profit MFIs. 
6.3 Regulated MFIs 
The regulation of MFIs has become increasingly popular in most developing countries for two 
reasons. First, donors and government agencies believe that the regulation of MFIs can help 
bring sustainability into their operations. Second, many MFIs are seeking transformation into 
regulated institutions in order to be able to access cheaper sources of finance including local 
currency deposits. In fact, Hartarska and Nadolnyak, (2007) suggest that there may be indirect 
benefits to regulation through access to clients’ savings. This may reduce the cost of capital for 
regulated MFIs and make buffer capital less expensive.  Thus, we examine the robustness of 
our results to the proposition that the negative effect of buffer capital and MFI performance 
may be driven by non-regulated MFIs. To achieve this, we run regressions for only regulated 
MFIs and report the results in Table 6, columns (5 and 6).  
The results in column (5) show that buffer capital on its own has a negative relationship 
with regulated MFIs’ performance (Buffer capital = –0.0970, t-statistics = –3.42). However, 
the interaction of buffer capital and loan portfolio quality leads to a positive relationship 
(Buffer capital*part30 = 0.5970, t-statistics = 3.12). Overall, the results are qualitatively similar 
to our earlier findings. 
[INSERT TABLE 6] 
6.4 Alternative Measure of Firm Performance – efficiency 
Previous studies have also used efficiency measures to examine MFIs’ performance (Hermes 
et al., 2011; Bos and Millone, 2015). This is important because efficiency is expected to lead 
to higher performance (Baik et al., 2013). Therefore, as a way of robustness, we also present 
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the results of the effect of buffer capital on MFIs’ efficiency in columns (1 and 2) of Table 7, 
using the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) approach. We follow the procedure adopted by 
Hermes et al. (2011) and estimate the cost function. The cost function is used to measure the 
cost of MFI operations to the cost of the best MFI if the two MFIs produced identical output 
under similar conditions (Hermes et al., 2011). We specify the cost function as: 
ln (𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0+𝛽1ln (𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2ln (𝑅𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3ln (𝐺𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡
2 ) + 𝛽5ln (𝑅𝑖𝑡
2 ) +
𝛽6ln (𝐺𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡
2) + 𝛽7ln (𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡)ln (𝑅𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽8ln (𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡)ln (𝐺𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽9ln (𝑅𝑖𝑡)ln (𝐺𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡) +
∑ 𝛽10
4
𝑗=𝑖 𝑀𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽11𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑉𝑖𝑡   (6) 
Where: TC = total costs of an MFI measured as the ratio of total expenses to total assets 
multiplied by total assets. Salary = the price of one factor of labour for one year, measured as 
the operating expenses to total assets ratio times total assets in US dollars. R = the interest 
expenses of holding money measured as the financial expenses to total assets ratio divided by 
the total deposits to total assets2. GLP= the gross loan portfolio. MFIType = a dummy variable 
equals to 1 if an MFI is a bank, 2 if an MFI is a cooperative, 3 if an MFI is a non-bank financial 
institution and 4 if an MFI is a non-governmental organisation. Loan loss reserves, which 
measures the risk-taking strategies among MFIs. To examine the effect of buffer capital on 
MFIs’ efficiency, we re-specify equation (5) and replace ROA with the efficiency measure.   
As anticipated, the results in column (1) show that buffer capital negatively impacts on 
MFIs’ efficiency (Buffer = –1.5615, t-statistics = –5.16). Specifically, a 10% increase in buffer 
capital leads to a 15.615% decrease in efficiency. Thus, MFIs that hold capital ratios above the 
optimal are less efficient. The results in column (2) show that the interaction of buffer capital-
loan portfolio quality is positive and statistically significant at the 5% (Buffer*Par30 = 3.9657, 
t-statistics = 2.17), suggesting that in the presence of poor loan portfolio quality the holding of 
buffer capital enhance MFIs’ efficiency.  
                                                          




6.5 Alternative Measure of Buffer Capital – actual capital ratio minus minimum capital 
requirement (buffer capital 1) 
Following Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2016), we test the sensitivity of our results to an alternative 
measure of buffer capital (buffer capital (1) as the difference between MFIs’ actual capital ratio 
and country minimum capital requirement. The results are presented in Table 7, columns (3 
and 4). Column (3) shows that buffer capital (1) has a negative relationship with MFI 
performance and the relationship is statistically significant (Buffer capital (1) = –0.0938, t-
statistics = –40.30). The results for the effect of the buffer capital (1)-loan portfolio quality 
interaction on MFI performance is also presented in column (4). It shows that the interaction 
of capital ratio (1) and loan portfolio quality impacts positively on MFI performance (Buffer 
capital (1) *par30 = 0.3685, t-statistics = 4.25). These indicate the robustness of our results to 
an alternative measure of buffer capital. 
 
6.6 Alternative Measure of poor loan quality – gross loan portfolio growth 
We also test the sensitivity of our main results to a change in measurement of the loan portfolio 
quality. More specifically, we replace the loan portfolio quality with the change in gross loan 
portfolio growth. The loan portfolio quality is an ex-post measure of portfolio risk; whereas 
the gross loan portfolio growth is an ex-ante measure of portfolio risk. We, therefore, examine 
the moderating effect of an ex-ante measure of portfolio risk to the relationship between buffer 
capital and MFI performance. The fact that gross loan portfolio represents the amount clients 
owe means an increase may lead to a higher risk of non-payment. 
The results are presented in Table 7, columns (5 and 6). Column (5) presents the result 
for the effect of buffer capital on the performance of MFIs after controlling for changes in gross 
loan portfolio growth. The results for the effect of the buffer capital and changes in gross loan 
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portfolio growth interaction on MFIs’ performance are also presented in column (6). The 
results confirm that the relationship between buffer capital and MFI performance remains 
negative and statistically significant. Also, changes in gross loan portfolio growth positively 
moderate the effect of buffer capital on MFIs’ performance. This shows that our results are 
robust to an alternative measure of loan portfolio quality.  
[INSERT TABLE 7] 
 
6.7 Endogeneity 
Generally, endogeneity may arise from three sources: omitted variable bias, a correlation 
between the error term and a regressor, and simultaneity (Wooldridge, 2002; Larcker and 
Rasticus, 2010; Ntim et al., 2012). With respect to this study, omitted variable endogeneity 
may arise if a relevant control variable is omitted due to data unavailability (Wooldridge, 2002; 
Ntim et al., 2012). In addition, our fixed effects estimates may be biased and inconsistent if 
buffer capital is not exogenous but rather correlated with the error term. Further, simultaneity 
arises when the independent variable – buffer capital is simultaneously determined by the 
dependent variable – ROA or OSS.  For example, Berger and Patti (2006) suggest that lower 
equity capital ratio is associated with higher performance in financial firms. However, MFIs 
lack debt funding, therefore, keeping buffer capital may result in high equity ratios (Garmaise 
and Natividad, 2013). Consequently, although we have assumed that buffer capital reduces 
MFI performance, it could be the case that high MFI performance simultaneously reduces the 
need to keep buffer capital. This is because high-performing MFIs may have a lower cost of 
capital and may keep less buffer capital because of their ability to raise capital at a lower cost 
when required. We, therefore, address endogeneity in two ways: First, we use the two-stage 




6.8 Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Estimation 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) recommend a 2SLS in dealing with simultaneity and other forms 
of endogeneity. We, therefore, employ a 2SLS estimation to address the problem of 
endogeneity. We first attempt to identify an instrument for the 2SLS regression. A suitable 
instrument should have a significant correlation with the main independent variable (Buffer 
capital) and insignificant or no correlation with the dependent variable (ROA). 
 Compared to lenders, borrowers are better informed on their willingness and capacity 
to repay their loans (Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2016). In the case of MFIs, the information 
asymmetry is likely to be higher because they mainly focus on clients that lack reliable financial 
information and collateral (Stiglitz, 1990). This increases the risk inherent in their loan 
portfolio necessitating higher capital ratios. Existing studies (Kearney et al., 2012; Faccio et 
al., 2016) suggest that decisions regarding the capital of financial institutions are strongly 
influenced by cultural factors. For example, people in high uncertainty avoidance cultures are 
more likely to take actions aimed at reducing the level of uncertainty (Hofstede, 2001). 
Accordingly, Chen et al. (2015) report that corporate cash holdings are higher in firms in high 
uncertainty avoidance countries. Their result is consistent with Li et al. (2013) who report that 
the higher levels of risk aversion in high uncertainty avoidance countries motivate them to hold 
more cash in anticipation of declining future cash flows. We argue that ceteres paribus MFIs 
in high uncertainty avoidance countries will keep buffer capital in anticipation of poor loan 
quality. We, therefore, employ uncertainty avoidance as measured by Hofstede (1980) as an 
instrument for buffer capital in addition to the control variables mentioned above. To justify 
the use of 2SLS estimation to control for endogeneity, we employ the Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
(DHW) test. The result, which is displayed in column (2) of Table 8, shows the presence of 
endogeneity and therefore warrant our use of 2SLS to control for endogeneity. 
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We note that uncertainty avoidance has a high and statistically significant correlation 
with buffer capital and a conventionally low and statistically insignificant correlation with our 
measure of MFI performance (not reported). We run the 2SLS using uncertainty avoidance as 
an instrument for buffer capital. In the first stage (column 1 of Table 8), we replace buffer 
capital with uncertainty avoidance and make buffer capital the dependent variable in equation 
(5). We then predict the value for buffer capital (buffer capital^) and use it as the main 
independent variable in equation (5). The results of the second stage of the 2SLS are shown in 
Table 8, column (2). The results indicate that buffer capital impacts negatively on ROA (buffer 
capital^ = –1.2404, t-statistics = –2.88). The results imply that buffer capital is still value 
decreasing in MFIs even after controlling for endogeneity. 
 
6.9 The Hausman-Taylor Estimation 
We based our analysis on the fixed effects regressions because results from the Hausman tests 
suggest that the fixed effects estimates are more consistent. However, Mundlak (1978) argues 
that the fixed effects model assumes endogeneity for all the regressors whilst the random 
effects model assumes exogeneity for all the regressors. “This all or nothing choice of 
correlation” can be problematic in models containing both endogenous and exogenous 
regressors (Baltagi et al., 2003, p. 261). In the current study, buffer capital may be 
endogenously determined (where high performing MFIs may choose to reduce costs by 
keeping lower buffer capital), but the inflation rate may be an exogenous variable.  
 Oh et al. (2016) suggest the Hauman-Taylor estimation as an improvement over the 
fixed and random effects models. The Hausman-Taylor model allows for the estimation of 
time-invariant regressors (Greene, 2003), and uses both the within-variation and between the 
variation of the exogenous variables as instruments to address the endogeneity problem 
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(Baltagi et al., 2003; Oh et al., 2016). Consequently, we re-estimate the buffer capital-MFI 
performance relationship using the Hausman-Taylor estimation.  
The results as shown in Table 8, columns (3 and 4) are consistent with the fixed effects 
estimates. The coefficient estimation of buffer capital is (–0.0991, t-statistics = –5.25) in 
column (3) whereas the interaction of buffer capital and loan portfolio quality is (0.8400, t-
statistics = 3.57) in column (4). The results indicate that buffer capital remains value decreasing 
in MFIs even after accounting separately for exogenous time-varying and time-invariant 
regressors, as well as endogenous time-varying regressors. However, buffer capital becomes 
value enhancing with poor loan portfolio quality. 
 
6.10 Survivorship bias 
Generally, survivorship bias arises when firms are excluded from the study sample for lack of 
complete data (Kestens et al., 2012). This is particularly critical in value relevance studies 
because poor performance is a major reason why firms disappear (Carvalhal and Nobili, 2011). 
Goto et al. (2015) suggest that survivorship bias may be reduced by including all firms within 
the sample periods. Consequently, we did not exclude MFIs without complete data from our 
sample.  Nevertheless, this can potentially result in an instance where the results are driven by 
firms with full data during the sample period. Therefore, following Schaeck and Cihak (2012), 
we investigate survivorship bias by restricting our sample to MFIs that did not have complete 
data during the sample period.  
The results are presented in Table 8, columns (5 and 6). Column (5) presents result for 
the effect of buffer capital on the performance of MFIs. The results for the effect of the buffer 
capital-loan portfolio quality interaction on MFIs’ performance are also presented in column 
(6). The results confirm that the relationship between buffer capital and MFI performance 
remains negative and statistically significant (–0.0885, t-statistics = –3.75). Also, loan portfolio 
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quality positively moderates the effect of buffer capital on MFIs’ performance (0.6940, t-
statistics = 4.34). This shows that our results are robust to survivorship bias.  
[INSERT TABLE 8] 
 
6.11 Oster test of endogeneity 
The Oster (2019) test is used to measure the influence that unobserved time variant and time 
invariant omitted variables have on the reported results (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Oster, 
2019). This is important because the omission of certain control variables may invalidate the 
results of the main variables (Wang and Yin, 2018). The presence of omitted variables bias is 
determined by testing the stability of the coefficients of interest, based on two main 
assumptions: (1) unobserved time variant and time invariant omitted variables have the same 
importance as the observed time-variant and time-invariant variables included in the main 
regressions; (2) the R2 from the main regressions can be improved by 1.3 times if the 
unobserved time variant and time invariant omitted variables are included in the main 
regressions. Thus, the Oster (2019) test is able to determine the extent to which the influence 
of the unobservables can cause the coefficient of the variables of interest to be redundant. This 
is a sensitivity-type test that measures the extent to which the inclusion of extra control 
variables will cause changes in the coefficient of the variables of interest and their R2. 
 We, therefore, follow the Oster (2019) test procedure as applied in other studies (Wang 
and Yin, 2018) to examine whether our main results reported in Table 5 suffer from omitted 
variables bias. The results are presented in Table 9. The columns in Table 9 presents 
information as follows: column (1) the coefficients of the variables of interest from Table 5; 
column (2) the 95% confidence intervals of the estimated coefficient of interest; column (3) 
the R2 from the main regressions; column (4) the identified set of bounds of the coefficient for 
the controlled set (β) and the full set (including omitted variables); column (5) the movement 
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in the coefficients of interest; and column (6) whether the coefficients of interest are within the 
95% confidence intervals. Overall, the results presented in Table 9 suggest that there is no 
omitted variables bias which is affecting the main results reported in Table 5. First, the results 
in column (5) indicate that the coefficients of the variables of interest all move away from zero, 
with the exception of Buffer*par30 in column (4). Second, the results contained in column (6) 
show that the coefficients of the variables of interest are all within the 95% intervals.  
[INSERT TABLE 9] 
7. Conclusion 
We examine the value relevance of buffer capital in MFIs around the world. Specifically, we 
address the question of whether buffer capital affects the performance of MFIs and how loan 
portfolio quality may moderate this relationship. The findings suggest a negative and 
statistically significant relationship between buffer capital and MFI performance. Nevertheless, 
buffer capital is value-increasing in MFIs with poor loan portfolio quality. Following on from 
this, we further examined whether this relationship differs in deposit-taking, profit-making, 
and regulated MFIs. The results indicate that buffer capital has an effect on the performance of 
deposit-taking, profit-making, and regulated MFIs.  
 There have been recent debates about the rampant collapses of MFIs. This paper adds 
to this debate by providing evidence on the relationship between buffer capital and the 
performance of MFIs. The main lesson from our study for managers and regulators of MFIs is 
that for improved performance, the level of capital kept by MFIs should be dependent on loan 
portfolio quality. The findings will be useful to regulators and policy makers especially in 
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Figure 1: presents the evolution of buffer capital and loan portfolio quality over the period 2010–2015. Buffer 
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Table 1: Description of variables and data source 
Variables Description Source 
MFI variables 
Return on assets The ratio of operating profit scaled by total assets MIX Market 
Efficiency  Estimated using the Stochastic Frontier Analysis Own calculation 
Operating self-
sufficiency 
Financial Revenue (Total)/ (Financial    





The rato of total equity to total assets. Own calculation 
Optimal capital 
ratio 
Predicted using MFI-specific andcountry level 
determinants. 
Own calculation 
Buffer capital Measure of capital buffer in absolute terms, that is, 
the difference between an MFI optimal adequacy ratio 






The ratio of portfolio at risk>30 days to gross loan MIX Market 
Size of loan 
portfolio 
Outstanding loan portfolio/total assets MIX Market 
Size  Total assets in US dollars  MIX Market 
Expenses to total 
assets 
The ratio of total expenses to total assets MIX Market 
Leverage  The ratio of liabilities to total assets. MIX Market 
Age Number of years functioning as an MFI  MIX Market 
Outreach A dummy variable equals to one for large outreach 
MFIs, two for medium outreach MFIs and three for 
small outreach MFIs. 
MIX Market 
Profit status A dummy variable equals to one for profit-making 
MFIs and zero otherwise. 
MIX Market 
Regulation A dummy variable equals to one if an MFI is subject 
to prudential rules and zero otherwise. 
MIX Market 
Target market A dummy indicator for the four target markets 
classified as broad (1), high-end (2), low-end (3) and 
small business (4). 
MIX Market 
Scale of operation Refers to the scale of financial products and services 
provided to the poor by MFI groups. MFIs are 
grouped into small, medium and large scale of 
operations 
MIX Market 
Learner Index Measures the competitiveness of the MFI market. Own calculation 
Deposit-taking A dummy variable equals to one if an MFI accepts 
deposits and zero otherwise. 
MIX Market 
Return on capital 
employed 
Measured as the ratio of profit for the year to equity 




A dummy variable that takes one if the MFI size 
belongs to the top quartile in the sample and zero 
otherwise 
Own calculation 
from Mix Market 
data 
Loan loss to gross 
loan (LLGL) 





Cost of funding 
(CF) 
The ratio of interest expenses on borrowings MIX Market 
Total cost Calculated as financial expenses plus operating 
expenses 
Own calculation 
from Mix Market 
data 
Labour  w1: personal expenses scaled by number of 
employees), financial capital (w2: financial expenses 
scaled by total liabilities), and physical capital [w3: 
(operating expenses minus personnel expenses) scaled 
by total assets] 
Own calculation 
from Mix Market 
data 




female directors  
The ratio of women directors to board size. MIX Market 
Country variables 
GDP growth The annual growth rate of the GDP per capita of a 
country. 
WDI 
Inflation/GDP Inflation as a percentage of GDP WDI 
Financial sector 
development 
Domestic credit by the financial sector. Includes all 
credit to various sectors. The financial sector includes 
monetary authorities and deposit money banks, as 
well as other financial corporations  
where data are available 
WDI 
Rule of law Measures the law and order tradition of countries WDI 
Political stability Measures the perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by 


















Table 2. Summary statistics 
Variable N mean SD P25 p50 p95 
ROA 1708 0.0286 0.0238 0.0128 0.0178 0.0646 
Operating self-sufficiency 1708 1.2384 0.1142 1.1881 1.2161 1.4164 
Buffer capital 1708 0.2358 0.0503 0.2012 0.2321 0.3227 
Optimal capital ratio 1708 0.3456 0.0489 0.3112 0.3412 0.4290 
Loan portfolio quality 1708 0.0871 0.0501 0.0594 0.0619 0.1801 
Minimum capital adequacy 1708 0.1098 0.0152 0.1000 0.1000 0.1200 
Outstanding Loan Portfolio 1708 0.8161 0.2967 0.7323 0.8232 1.0077 
Size ($ Million) 1708 83.500 28800 4.6159 14.300 39400 
Expenses/Assets 1708 0.2135 0.0706 0.1989 0.2058 0.2740 
Leverage  1708 0.7231 0.2072 0.6237 0.8112 0.9384 
Age  1708 2.7102 0.5887 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 
Outreach 1708 1.8806 0.9003 1.0000 2.0000 3.0000 
Profit Status 1708 0.4251 0.4945 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Regulation 1708 0.5867 0.4926 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Target Market 1708 2.1897 1.0057 1.0000 3.0000 3.0000 
Scale of operation 1708 1.9602 0.8445 1.0000 2.0000 3.0000 
Board size 1708 9.3835 24.9840 5.0000 7.0000 15.0000 
Female 1708 0.2954 0.2219 0.1500 0.2845 0.7300 
GDP Growth 1708 0.0504 0.0228 0.0353 0.0495 0.0841 
Inflation/GDP 1708 0.0663 0.0516 0.0358 0.0597 0.1526 
Financial Sector Development 1708 0.3973 0.1730 0.2614 0.3980 0.6603 
Rule of Law 1708 -0.5045 0.5128 -0.9293 -0.5508 0.5237 
Political Stability 1708 -0.6310 0.7277 -1.1251 -0.6395 0.2671 
This Table displays summary statistics for variables used in the regression tests. Definitions of the variables are 


































Afghanistan 12 0.3532 0.2332 0.0279 1.2073 42 126 
Argentina 11.5 0.3450 0.2300 0.0317 1.3133 9 27 
Armenia 10 0.3847 0.2847 0.0150 1.2246 4 8 
Azerbaijan 10 0.3572 0.2572 0.0215 1.2535 4 13 
Bangladesh 10 0.3463 0.2463 0.0273 1.1466 28 69 
Benin 15 0.3306 0.1806 0.0267 1.5064 14 13 
Bolivia 10 0.4029 0.3029 0.0172 1.2174 3 9 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 12 0.3651 0.2451 0.0284 1.2269 7 12 
Bulgaria 12 0.4103 0.2903 0.0094 1.2148 4 6 
Cambodia 15 0.3604 0.2104 0.0362 1.2283 1 2 
Chile 10 0.3967 0.2967 0.0493 1.1874 5 11 
Colombia 9 0.3224 0.2324 0.0295 1.1965 27 88 
Dominican Republic 10 0.3512 0.2512 0.0262 1.3055 10 47 
Ecuador 9 0.3449 0.2649 0.0216 1.2439 16 29 
Egypt 10 0.3955 0.2955 0.0128 1.2336 8 21 
El Salvador 12 0.3839 0.2639 0.0196 1.2666 15 43 
Ethiopia 12 0.3708 0.2508 0.0140 1.2308 1 2 
Georgia 12 0.4261 0.3061 0.0109 1.2336 1 3 
Ghana 10 0.2962 0.1962 0.0289 1.2069 10 13 
Guatemala 10 0.3724 0.2724 0.0291 1.2064 19 65 
Haiti 12 0.3559 0.2359 0.0301 1.1166 21 45 
Honduras 10 0.3368 0.2368 0.0232 1.2447 21 87 
India 15 0.3373 0.2173 0.0335 1.2007 104 289 
Jordan 12 0.3944 0.2744 0.0234 1.2150 8 21 
Kenya 12 0.3340 0.2140 0.0191 1.2576 14 25 
Kosovo 12 0.2531 0.1331 0.0133 1.2011 1 1 
Malawi 10 0.2857 0.1857 0.0103 1.1934 1 3 
Nigeria 10 0.2955 0.1955 0.0323 1.2041 7 13 
Pakistan 15 0.3629 0.2129 0.0185 1.2498 24 41 
Paraguay 10 0.3297 0.2297 0.0339 1.1828 51 223 
Peru 10 0.3356 0.2356 0.0287 1.1697 37 87 
Philippines 10 0.3498 0.2498 0.0254 1.2105 40 76 
Rwanda 15 0.3628 0.2128 0.0242 1.2190 3 9 
Swaziland 8 0.3650 0.2750 0.0273 1.2143 2 2 
Tajikistan 12 0.3127 0.1927 0.0336 1.2178 11 41 
Togo 12 0.3587 0.2387 0.0280 1.2485 23 61 
Tunisia 10 0.3745 0.2745 0.0225 1.1984 13 46 
Uganda 20 0.3331 0.1331 0.0180 1.2113 5 10 
Ukraine 10 0.3098 0.2098 0.0141 1.2599 1 3 
Vietnam 10 0.3571 0.2571 0.0532 1.3361 10 18 
This Table reports, by countries, the means of minimum capital requirement, optimal capital ratio, buffer capital 
ratio, ROA and OSS; and number and observations of MFIs, respectively 
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Table 4. Correlation matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
ROA 1           
Operating self-sufficiency 0.5391* 1          
Buffer capital -0.1332* -0.0248 1         
Loan portfolio quality -0.2310* -0.2275* -0.3122* 1        
Outstanding Loan Portfolio 0.1723* 0.3443* 0.0332 -0.2698* 1       
Size (log) ($ Million) -0.0973* -0.2905* -0.2351* -0.0246 0.0237 1      
Expenses/Assets -0.1489* -0.2254* -0.0714* 0.2799* 0.0162 -0.0708* 1     
Leverage  0.1518* 0.0689* -0.1451* -0.0861* 0.1132* 0.2215* -0.0287 1    
Age  -0.0222 -0.0822* 0.0355 0.0142 0.0054 0.2043* -0.0685* -0.0544* 1   
Outreach 0.0957* 0.1848* -0.0417 0.0796* -0.0517* -0.4839* 0.0385 -0.1168* -0.0432 1  
Profits Status -0.0668* -0.0455 -0.1658* 0.0407 0.0069 0.2586* -0.0245 0.1026* -0.2829* -0.2478* 1 
Regulation 0.0131 -0.0534* -0.2997* 0.0121 0.0374 0.3755* -0.0013 0.3575* -0.1063* -0.2118* 0.3057* 
Target Market -0.0169 0.1468* 0.2321* -0.0705* 0.0619* -0.1820* 0.0678* -0.1055* -0.1555* -0.0947* 0.0981* 
Scale of operation 0.0766* 0.1787* 0.0008 0.1485* -0.0661* -0.4993* 0.0338 -0.1364* 0.0015 0.3474* -0.1362* 
Board size -0.0188 -0.0305 -0.0817* 0.0554* -0.0373 0.1220* -0.0083 0.0333 0.0454 0.001 -0.0602* 
Female 0.2765* 0.1225* 0.0229 -0.0116 -0.0156 -0.1491* -0.0058 -0.0706* 0.1357* 0.1159* -0.1893* 
GDP Growth 0.0786* 0.0619* -0.1675* 0.0311 0.0129 0.0738* -0.0827* 0.2098* -0.1433* -0.1252* 0.0676* 
Inflation/GDP 0.0211 0.0692* -0.0083 0.0161 -0.0188 -0.1496* 0.0125 0.0796* -0.1288* 0.0326 0.0254 
Financial Sector Development 0.0501* 0.1142* 0.0886* -0.1121* 0.1748* -0.0285 -0.0253 -0.1035* -0.0148 -0.0548* -0.0507* 
Rule of Law 0.002 0.0986* 0.0789* -0.0493* 0.0923* -0.0172 -0.0095 -0.0752* -0.0768* -0.1285* 0.0761* 






Table 4. Correlation matrix (Continued) 
Variables 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
Regulation 1          
Target Market -0.2165* 1         
Scale of operation -0.2297* 0.0882* 1        
Board size 0.0708* -0.0949* -0.0044 1       
Female -0.0668* -0.0285 0.0711* -0.0025 1      
GDP Growth 0.2696* 0.0875* -0.0388 -0.022 -0.0233 1     
Inflation/GDP 0.0500* 0.1456* 0.0645* -0.0626* -0.0655* 0.1184* 1    
Financial Sector Development -0.0480* 0.0849* 0.0321 0.0057 -0.0138 -0.0428 -0.0929* 1   
Rule of Law -0.1322* 0.3365* 0.0314 0.0169 -0.0997* 0.1337* -0.04 0.4491* 1  
Political Stability 0.2409* 0.1390* -0.1478* -0.0381 -0.0379 0.2230* 0.1928* -0.0794* -0.2934* 1 
This Table presents the correlation coefficients among all variables used in regression tests. All variables are as defined in Table 1. *indicates statistical 













Table 5. Results of the influence of buffer on ROA and OSS 
 ROA OSS 
Variables (1)   (2) (3) (4) 
Buffer Capital –0.1015*** –0.1628*** –0.5394*** –0.6952*** 
 (–4.54) (–5.92) (–4.05) (–4.12) 
Loan portfolio quality (Par30) –0.1108*** –0.2771*** –0.2388*** –0.6820*** 
 (–11.39) (–7.10) (–3.28) (–2.81) 
Buffer Capital * Par30  0.6652***  1.7591** 
  (4.54)  (2.20) 
Outstanding Loan Portfolio 0.0096*** 0.0091*** 0.1225*** 0.1214*** 
 (7.48) (6.91) (5.26) (5.31) 
Size (log) ($ Million) –0.0013*** –0.0013*** –0.0257*** –0.0256*** 
 (–2.83) (–2.81) (–7.11) (–7.11) 
Expenses/Assets –0.0373*** –0.0332*** –0.4345*** –0.4224*** 
 (–4.31) (–3.84) (–4.58) (–4.41) 
Leverage  0.0167*** 0.0167*** 0.0411 0.0415 
 (5.17) (5.17) (1.63) (1.63) 
Age  –0.0011 –0.0010 –0.0025 –0.0021 
 (–0.99) (–0.91) (–0.36) (–0.30) 
Outreach 0.0011 0.0010 0.0080*** 0.0078*** 
 (1.61) (1.48) (2.78) (2.71) 
Profit Status –0.0009 –0.0010 –0.0021 –0.0025 
 (–0.65) (–0.75) (–0.30) (–0.35) 
Regulation  –0.0013 –0.0012 0.0091 0.0093 
 (–0.86) (–0.83) (1.02) (1.05) 
Target Market –0.0000 0.0001 0.0161*** 0.0163*** 
 (–0.03) (0.09) (3.72) (3.74) 
Scale of operation 0.0015* 0.0014* 0.0009 0.0007 
 (1.67) (1.65) (0.33) (0.27) 
Board size –0.0000 –0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (–1.52) (–1.35) (0.52) (0.65) 
Female 0.0294*** 0.0291*** 0.0557*** 0.0546*** 
 (6.59) (6.53) (4.14) (4.05) 
GDP Growth 0.0264 0.0211 –0.3485** –0.3607** 
 (0.84) (0.68) (–2.27) (–2.34) 
Inflation/GDP 0.0075 0.0057 –0.0615 –0.0663 
 (0.79) (0.60) (–1.39) (–1.48) 
Financial Sector Development 0.0036 0.0033 0.0274 0.0257 
 (0.73) (0.66) (0.89) (0.83) 
Rule of Law 0.0011 0.0012 0.0079 0.0086 
 (0.63) (0.70) (0.68) (0.74) 
Political Stability 0.0002 0.0002 –0.0063 –0.0062 
 (0.21) (0.22) (–1.13) (–1.10) 
Constant 0.0611*** 0.0766*** 1.7359*** 1.7760*** 
 (4.73) (5.67) (19.41) (18.70) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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R–Sq 0.3514 0.3560 0.3399 0.3396 
Chi–Sq 422.72*** 437.39*** 217.54*** 217.09*** 
N 1708 1708 1708 1708 
The Table shows the fixed effects regression results of the relationship between buffer capital and 
ROA (columns 1 and 2) and OSS (columns 3 and 4) with robust standard errors and control for 
year–fixed effects. All variables are defined in Table 1. t–statistics are shown in parentheses. ***, 

































Table 6. Results based on deposit–takers, profit status and regulated MFIs 
 Deposit-takers Profit status Regulated MFIs 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Buffer Capital –0. 0737** –0.1129*** –0.0850*** –0.1602*** –0.0970*** –0.1497*** 
 (–1.97) (–2.63) (–2.77) (–4.52) (–3.42) (–4.23) 
Loan portfolio quality (Par30) –0.0927*** –0.2251*** –0.1136*** –0.3192*** –0.1166*** –0.2560*** 
 (–4.87) (–3.27) (–8.62) (–6.59) (–8.62) (–5.26) 
Buffer Capital * Par30  0.5234**  0.8632***  0.5970*** 
  (2.06)  (4.63)  (3.12) 
Outstanding Loan Portfolio 0.0133 0.0104 0.0093*** 0.0090*** 0.0101*** 0.0098*** 
 (1.30) (1.03) (8.71) (7.72) (7.70) (7.32) 
Size (log) ($ Million) –0.0006 –0.0005 –0.0013** –0.0011** –0.0012** –0.0012** 
 (–0.77) (–0.71) (–2.41) (–2.16) (–2.22) (–2.19) 
Expenses/Assets –0.4452*** –0.4502*** –0.0157** –0.0117* –0.0307*** –0.0285*** 
 (–4.14) (–4.20) (–2.28) (–1.72) (–3.67) (–3.35) 
Leverage  0.0308*** 0.0311*** 0.0108** 0.0108** 0.0164*** 0.0167*** 
 (4.05) (4.08) (2.26) (2.29) (3.70) (3.78) 
Age  –0.0003 –0.0003 –0.0007 –0.0008 –0.0014 –0.0014 
 (–0.14) (–0.17) (–0.54) (–0.65) (–0.96) (–0.98) 
Outreach –0.0002 –0.0003 0.0018* 0.0017* 0.0012 0.0011 
 (–0.17) (–0.28) (1.87) (1.87) (1.28) (1.22) 
Profit Status –0.0014 –0.0017   –0.0005 –0.0006 
 (–0.57) (–0.67)   (–0.28) (–0.32) 
Regulation  –0.0068** –0.0064** –0.0013 –0.0010   
 (–2.37) (–2.19) (–0.56) (–0.42)   
Target Market –0.0023* –0.0024* –0.0009 –0.0011 –0.0013 –0.0012 
 (–1.71) (–1.78) (–0.86) (–1.10) (–1.36) (–1.31) 
Scale of operation 0.0003 0.0004 0.0009 0.0009 0.0018* 0.0018* 
 (0.18) (0.26) (0.83) (0.87) (1.71) (1.68) 
Board size –0.0000 –0.0000 –0.0002*** –0.0002*** –0.0000 –0.0000 
 (–0.34) (–0.08) (–5.03) (–4.68) (–1.50) (–1.36) 
Female 0.0306*** 0.0304*** 0.0267*** 0.0276*** 0.0301*** 0.0304*** 
 (4.23) (4.20) (3.66) (3.77) (4.93) (4.99) 
GDP Growth 0.1064* 0.1061* 0.0404 0.0315 0.0465 0.0384 
 (1.89) (1.89) (0.91) (0.73) (1.11) (0.92) 
Inflation/GDP 0.0539** 0.0542** 0.0067 0.0032 0.0138 0.0128 
 (2.32) (2.33) (0.38) (0.18) (1.19) (1.11) 
Financial Sector Development 0.0068 0.0070 –0.0015 –0.0036 –0.0016 –0.0029 
 (0.95) (0.98) (–0.22) (–0.57) (–0.23) (–0.43) 
Rule of Law 0.0003 0.0007 0.0003 0.0010 0.0007 0.0010 
 (0.09) (0.24) (0.12) (0.37) (0.31) (0.46) 
Political Stability 0.0004 0.0007 0.0013 0.0019 –0.0000 0.0002 
 (0.23) (0.38) (0.78) (1.18) (–0.02) (0.14) 
Constant 0.1104*** 0.1233*** 0.0579*** 0.0759*** 0.0592*** 0.0725*** 
 (4.16) (4.42) (3.91) (4.98) (3.53) (4.02) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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R–Sq 0.3487 0.3489 0.3710 0.3870 0.3606 0.3675 
Chi–Sq 215.82*** 212.29*** 331.38*** 323.99*** 232.01*** 233.86*** 
N 590 590 726 726 1002 1002 
The Table shows the fixed effects regression results of the relationship between buffer capital and performance of deposit–taking 
MFIs (columns 1 and 2), profit status MFIs (columns 3 and 4) and regulated MFIs (columns 5 and 6) with robust standard errors 
and control for year–fixed effects. The dependent variable in all columns is ROA. All variables are defined in Table 1. t-statistics 
are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  














Table 7. Alternative measure of performance, buffer capital and loan portfolio quality   
 EFFICIENCY ROA 
OLPG 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Buffer capital –1.5615*** –1.9115***   –0.0773** –0.2509*** 
 (–5.16) (–5.01)   (–2.50) (–5.14) 
Buffer capital (1)   –0.0938*** –0.1229***   
   (–40.30) (–19.49)   
Loan portfolio quality (Par30) –1.1524*** –2.1522*** –0.0528*** –0.1635***   
 (–6.70) (–3.84) (–7.36) (–5.52)   
Buffer Capital * Par30  3.9657**     
  (2.17)     
Buffer Capital (1) * Par30    0.3685***   
    (4.25)   
Outstanding Loan Portfolio growth (OLPG)     –0.0460* –0.3565*** 
     (–1.87) (–4.92) 
Buffer Capital * OLPG      1.4704*** 
      (4.32) 
Outstanding Loan Portfolio 0.3051*** 0.3028*** 0.0075*** 0.0070*** 0.0122** 0.0102** 
 (4.45) (4.48) (5.92) (5.53) (2.52) (2.20) 
Size (log) ($ Million) –0.0629*** –0.0629*** –0.0013*** –0.0012*** –0.0001 –0.0001 
 (–7.23) (–7.24) (–4.64) (–4.28) (–0.20) (–0.13) 
Expenses/Assets –1.1009*** –1.0733*** –0.0233*** –0.0204*** –0.0741*** –0.0673*** 
 (–5.14) (–4.98) (–4.42) (–3.97) (–2.87) (–2.91) 
Leverage  0.0272 0.0281 0.0097*** 0.0092*** 0.0246*** 0.0223*** 
 (0.49) (0.50) (4.44) (4.24) (5.13) (4.75) 
Age  –0.0068 –0.0058 –0.0009 –0.0009 –0.0029* –0.0022 
 (–0.41) (–0.35) (–1.13) (–1.19) (–1.74) (–1.28) 
Outreach 0.0024 0.0019 0.0008* 0.0009* 0.0016* 0.0016* 
 (0.40) (0.31) (1.76) (1.92) (1.72) (1.82) 
Profit Status –0.0089 –0.0096 –0.0014 –0.0013 –0.0012 –0.0010 
 (–0.54) (–0.59) (–1.57) (–1.45) (–0.60) (–0.53) 
Regulation  0.0359* 0.0365* –0.0006 –0.0005 –0.0037* –0.0038* 
 (1.75) (1.78) (–0.60) (–0.47) (–1.83) (–1.91) 
Target Market 0.0414*** 0.0419*** 0.0004 0.0002 0.0008 0.0012 
 (4.03) (4.07) (0.78) (0.49) (0.80) (1.35) 
Scale of operation –0.0072 –0.0076 0.0009 0.0009 0.0007 0.0007 
 (–1.31) (–1.37) (1.53) (1.58) (0.64) (0.62) 
Board size 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 –0.0001*** –0.0001*** 
 (1.11) (1.29) (1.49) (0.88) (–4.97) (–5.51) 
Female 0.0842*** 0.0816*** 0.0235*** 0.0238*** 0.0226*** 0.0207*** 
 (2.78) (2.68) (7.32) (7.39) (3.90) (3.58) 
GDP Growth –1.2087*** –1.2355*** 0.0456*** 0.0476*** 0.0031 0.0047 
 (–3.51) (–3.58) (2.93) (3.12) (0.07) (0.10) 
Inflation/GDP –0.2305** –0.2413** 0.0079 0.0082 –0.0317 –0.0268 
 (–2.26) (–2.33) (1.13) (1.26) (–1.52) (–1.40) 
Financial Sector Development 0.0250  0.0207 0.0062* 0.0055* 0.0051 0.0021 
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 (0.35) (0.29) (1.83) (1.68) (0.88) (0.40) 
Rule of Law 0.0140 0.0157 0.0001 0.0003 –0.0000 0.0010 
 (0.54) (0.60) (0.08) (0.30) (–0.00) (0.53) 
Political Stability –0.0278** –0.0274** –0.0005 –0.0003 –0.0013 –0.0010 
 (–2.19) (–2.16) (–0.77) (–0.47) (–0.98) (–0.77) 
Constant 1.9529*** 2.0429*** 0.0566*** 0.0630*** 0.0397** 0.0779*** 
 (9.18) (9.02) (8.10) (9.08) (2.18) (4.22) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R–Sq 0.4194 0.4197 0.4005 0.4000 0.2440 0.2777 
Chi–Sq 378.87*** 394.77*** 217.54*** 217.09*** 139.98*** 189.91*** 
N 1708 1708 1708 1708 857 857 
The Table shows the fixed effects regression results of the relationship between buffer capital and efficiency (columns 1 and 2), buffer capital 
(1) and ROA (columns 3 and 4) and outstanding loan portfolio growth (columns 5 and 6). Buffer capital (1) is defined as capital ratio minum 
capital adequacy. We report the unstandadised coefficients. All variables are defined in Table 1. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. ***, **, 

























Table 8. Results based on 2SLS, Hausman-Taylor Estimation and selection bias 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Buffer Capital
^
  –1.2404***     
  (–2.88)   
  
Buffer Capital   –0.0991*** –0.1671*** –0.0885*** –0.1539*** 
   (–5.25) (–6.24) (–3.75) (–5.10) 
Loan portfolio quality (Par30) -0.0322*** –0.2056*** –0.0797*** –0.2933*** –0.1139*** –0.2870*** 
 (4.54) (–5.16) (–4.51) (–4.70) (–11.08) (–6.75) 
Buffer Capital * Par30    0.8400***  0.6940*** 
    (3.57)  (4.34) 
Uncertainty Avoidance 0.0612***      
 (2.68)      
Outstanding Loan Portfolio 0.0095*** 0.0149*** 0.0110** 0.0102** 0.0095*** 0.0090*** 
 (4.57) (3.89) (2.21) (2.05) (7.39) (6.75) 
Size (log) ($ Million) –0.0058*** –0.0071*** –0.0016 –0.0017 –0.0014*** –0.0013*** 
 (–10.96) (–3.02) (–1.47) (–1.60) (–2.79) (–2.80) 
Expenses/Assets –0.0384*** –0.0608*** –0.0522*** –0.0450*** –0.0337*** –0.0296*** 
 (–4.41) (–3.73) (–5.15) (–4.37) (–4.02) (–3.51) 
Leverage  0.0019 0.0257*** 0.0204*** 0.0210*** 0.0169*** 0.0170*** 
 (0.42) (4.58) (3.93) (4.06) (5.11) (5.15) 
Age  0.0001 0.0000 –0.0010 –0.0007 –0.0009 –0.0008 
 (0.09) (0.03) (–0.73) (–0.53) (–0.82) (–0.73) 
Outreach –0.0098*** –0.0101** 0.0010 0.0009 0.0013 0.0012 
 (–12.11) (–2.36) (1.30) (1.17) (1.64) (1.53) 
Profit Status –0.0094*** –0.0101** –0.0018 –0.0017 –0.0007 –0.0009 
 (–6.46) (–2.56) (–0.96) (–0.94) (–0.45) (–0.59) 
Regulation  –0.0163*** –0.0161*** –0.0006 –0.0003 –0.0011 –0.0011 
 (–7.58) (–2.78) (–0.28) (–0.18) (–0.71) (–0.72) 
Target Market 0.0151*** 0.0152*** 0.0001 0.0001 –0.0001 –0.0001 
 (18.70) (2.59) (0.17) (0.09) (–0.14) (–0.07) 
Scale of operation –0.0082*** –0.0071** 0.0012 0.0011 0.0017* 0.0016* 
 (–9.76) (–2.03) (1.07) (1.00) (1.74) (1.71) 
Board size –0.0001** –0.0001 –0.0001** –0.0001** –0.0000 –0.0000 
 (–2.18) (–1.58) (–2.26) (–2.09) (–1.43) (–1.27) 
Female –0.0050* 0.0258*** 0.0266*** 0.0258*** 0.0304*** 0.0302*** 
 (–1.72) (6.32) (5.79) (5.62) (6.44) (6.39) 
GDP Growth –0.7322*** –0.7810** 0.0043 0.0041 0.0375 0.0334 
 (–22.18) (–2.49) (0.15) (0.14) (1.10) (0.99) 
Inflation/GDP –0.2152*** –0.2390** 0.0001 –0.0011 0.0111 0.0089 
 (–16.63) (–2.51) (0.01) (–0.09) (1.15) (0.92) 
Financial Sector Development 0.0313*** 0.0366*** 0.0040 0.0032 0.0038 0.0035 
 (6.34) (2.67) (0.82) (0.68) (0.75) (0.69) 
Rule of Law –0.0109*** –0.0125** 0.0011 0.0014 0.0014 0.0015 
 (–6.58) (–2.29) (0.57) (0.75) (0.73) (0.77) 
Political Stability –0.0155*** –0.0174** –0.0005 –0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 
 (–14.30) (–2.55) (–0.40) (–0.22) (0.31) (0.32) 
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Constant 0.3879*** 0.5167*** –0.0344 0.0027 0.0556*** 0.0723*** 
 (34.16) (2.97) (–0.04) (0.00) (4.14) (5.06) 
DHW test of endogeneity _ 18.8405*** _ _ 0.3588 0.3635 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Chi–Sq 230.67*** 198.45*** 222.72*** 237.30*** 403.69*** 415.49*** 
N 1708 1708 1708 1708 1438 1438 
The Table shows the second stage estimations of the 2SLS regression results (column 1),  the Hausman–Taylor estimation 
regression results (columns 2 and 3) and selection bias results (columns 4 and 5). We report the unstandadised coefficients. The 
dependent variable is ROA in all columns. All variables are defined in Table 1. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9. Coefficient Stability Method – Omitted Variable Bias Test 
 Controlled regression Uncontrolled regression Interpretation 




Table Regression Variables 
Coefficient  
from the  
regression 
95% confidence  




of the  
regression 
 
Identified set of bounds  





away from  
zero 
Coefficient falls within 
the 95% confidence  
intervals 
5 
Column 1 Buffer capital –0.1015 –0.1769             0.0007 
 
0.3514 –0.1015                       –0.0606 Yes Yes 
 Column 2 Buffer capital *par30   0.6652   0.3470             1.3207 0.3560   0.6652                       –0.4115 Yes Yes 
 Column 3 Buffer capital  –0.5394 –2.1108             0.8200 0.3399 –0.5394                         0.1379 Yes Yes 
 Column 4 Buffer capital*par30   1.7591   1.0457             8.1381 0.3396   1.7591                       –5.9890 No Yes 
This Table presents the results of the test for potential omitted variables following the approach of Oster (2019). As recommended by Oster (2019). We run the methods of coefficient stability for our 
main regressions in Table 5. Columns (1), (2) and (3) show the coefficients, confidence intervals and the R–squared from the main regressions. Columns (5) and (6) report whether the bias–adjusted 
coefficient 𝛽∗ in the identified set bounds meets the two robustness criteria in Oster (2019), specifically column (5) reports if the bias adjusted coefficient moves further away from zero and column 
(6) reports whether the changes in the adjusted coefficient fall within the 95% confidence intervals of the estimated coefficient β in the main regression. All variables are as defined in Table 1. 
 
 
 
